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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study examined people’s attitudes towards killing bugs and their bug-killing 
behaviour in the context of nature vs. nurture explanations of bug killing. Previous 
research shows that exposure to genetic (i.e., nature) explanations could have undesirable 
effects on people’s attitudes and behaviour, compared to the exposure to experiential  
(i.e., nurture) explanations. Genetic explanations for killing may affect attitudes towards 
killing and killing behaviour, because they suggest that killing behaviour is 
predetermined or programmed by nature. Such explanations may also be used by 
individuals to overcome guilt and dissonance from prior killing or killing in which they 
are about to participate. This study tested the idea that exposure to genetic explanations 
for bug killing would lead people to view killing bugs as more morally acceptable, as 
well as lead them to kill more bugs. A sample of university students was randomly 
assigned into three conditions, in which they read either genetic or experiential 
explanations for why people kill bugs or read a neutral passage. The study utilised a 
procedure in which participants were led to believe that they were killing bugs (although 
in actuality no bugs were killed), to observe their killing behaviour in a self-paced killing 
task.  Half of the participants were also asked to kill a bug prior to the self-paced killing 
task. Results showed that participants who read genetic explanations viewed bug killing 
as more morally acceptable, compared to participants who read experiential explanations, 
and this occurred particularly among those who engaged in the prior killing task. 
However, no similar effects emerged for the number of bugs killed, though there was a 
positive correlation between the moral acceptance of bug killing and the number of bugs 
killed. Implications of genetic explanations with respect to aggression and killing are 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Background 
 
 
Killing is seen as the most destructive of all human behaviours and research shows that, 
along with torture, it is the most disapproved of all aggressive acts (Lagerspetz &  
Westman, 1980). Yet, the twentieth century alone has witnessed the killing of more than 
200 million people, mostly in acts of genocide, massacres and extrajudicial executions 
(Rummel, 1986, 1995). While some theories emphasise existing social and cultural 
aspects to explain the origin, causes and prevalence of human aggression and killing 
(e.g., see Bandura, 1973; Berkowitz, 1993), others stress on biological, genetic and 
evolutionary mechanisms – whether they call it a “killer instinct,”1 “party-gang traits” 
(Wrangham & Peterson, 1997, p. 167) or a “warrior gene” (e.g., see Gibbons, 2004). As 
apparent, these latter types of theories portray a very deterministic and pessimistic view 
of human nature because they suggest that humans are predisposed to aggression and 
killing. In fact, the renowned psychologist, Freud (1930/1989), who also associated 
aggression with instincts, believed that aggression is unavoidable and later in his life he 
became pessimistic about achieving peace in the world (Lippa, 1994, p. 434). This raises 
an important question – can such theories of killing affect people’s attitudes towards 
killing, or, more importantly, their killing behaviour?  
 
                                               
1 The phrase “killer instinct” is often used in reference to Konrad Lorenz’s work on aggression and instinct 
theory, although it is not known whether Lorenz himself used the phrase. For example, some of the copies 
of his book On Aggression carry the blurb “The Revolutionary study of the “killer instinct” in animals and 
man –The New York Times”.  
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Like many other issues of human behaviour or human nature, most theories and 
explanations of aggression and killing could fall into two different categories, genetic and 
experiential. By “genetic explanations” I refer to those theories and explanations that 
portray killing and other aggressive behaviours as inborn and innate. In contrast, 
“experiential explanations” refer to those theories and explanations that emphasise 
cultural or social factors, depicting killing and other forms of aggression as more 
malleable responses, and products of experience, socialisation and learning. Although 
many scholars now believe in the interaction between genetic and experiential factors, 
this issue, as depicted by the old nature-nurture debate, is still contentious. That is, 
scholars differ over the extent to which human behaviour is influenced by genes and 
experience, or the extent to which they emphasise one explanation over the other, as well 
as the implications that may follow by endorsing one aspect or the other (e.g., see Dupré, 
2003; Eric, 2006; Herrnstein, 1990; Suzuki & Aronson, 2005; Dar-Nimrod, 2007).  
 
The present research investigates killing behaviour in humans in the context of genetic 
versus experiential explanations. However, the purpose is not to engage in or evaluate the 
nature-nurture debate with respect to aggression or killing, but to study the potential 
implications of presenting one explanation for killing to the exclusion of the other. Critics 
of genetic proposals of human behaviour (e.g., S. D. Nelson, 1975) have long been 
concerned that genetic explanations may have negative psychological, social and political 
implications. For example, it may be possible that when such explanations are presented 
in isolation, they are more likely to constrain the way people think about  harmful 
behaviours and so, they may be more likely to justify or perpetuate these behaviours. 
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If the above suggestions regarding genetic explanations are true, then the possibility 
exists that genetically-oriented scientific endeavours that aim to understand and so 
ultimately reduce aggression or killing may backfire—it may be that genetic explanations 
for killing behaviour create a tendency in people to approve of or accept killing more, as 
well as kill more. However, to date, no laboratory investigations have been conducted to 
understand the possible psychological effects of genetic explanations on people’s 
attitudes about killing (e.g., moral acceptance of killing) or killing behaviour itself. 
Therefore, this study will mainly focus on exploring the effects of genetic explanations 
on killing behaviour and moral acceptance of killing, and their implications. 
 
1.2  Genetic Explanations of Aggression and Killing 
  
 
Genetic explanations have been applied in various forms to explain the causes of 
aggression, including killing behaviour in humans. These explanations range from the 
instinct theories that date back to Freud and Lorenz, to more recent hypotheses that are 
based on findings that link aggressive or violent behaviours with specific hormones and 
genes.  
 
According to instinct theories, humans and other animals have innate aggressive impulses 
or drives that must be somehow released (Freud, 1930/1989; Lorenz, 1966). According to 
Freud, these instincts can only be suppressed at the expense of the individual’s own 
pleasures. Lorenz went on to suggest that many of the social and psychological problems 
that human beings are facing today could be a result of the inadequate discharge of these 
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aggressive impulses. Thus, according to Lorenz, killing among humans appears to be an 
excessive form of discharging these innate aggressive impulses; and although there are 
also social instincts or inhibitions against killing, the rapid cultural and social 
developments, including the invention of hi-tech weapons, has upset the balancing 
mechanism. 
 
Whereas instinct theories suggest that aggressive behaviours are innate and impulsive, 
theories based on evolution and evolutionary psychology try to understand why and how 
such instincts first originated in us. According to evolutionary theories, aggression is a 
behaviour inherited from our ancestors, who were successful in adapting to certain 
problems by means of these behaviours (Buss & Shackelford, 1997). In fact, Buss (2005, 
pp. 36, 240), asserts that the human mind has evolved with certain adaptations that 
motivate us to kill. According to these evolutionary theories, killing becomes the perfect 
behavioural strategy, especially for males, under certain circumstances. Wrangham and 
Peterson (1997) stated in more explicit terms that we are “cursed with demonic males” 
(p. 167). The authors explain this as follows: 
why are human males given to vicious, lethal aggression? Thinking only of war, 
putting aside for the moment rape and battering and murder, the curse stems from 
our species’ own special party-gang traits:  coalitionary bonds among males, male 
dominion over an expandable territory, and variable party size. The combination 
of these traits means that killing a neighbouring male is usually worthwhile, and 
can often be done safely. (p.167) 
 
 
Similarly, in a more recent proposal, Nell (2006) suggests that killing and other cruel 
behaviours are products of our evolutionary past that became reinforced during predation. 
This reinforcement was brought about by what Nell calls the “pain-blood-death” (p. 212) 
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complex that involves certain stimuli, such as the sight and sounds of the prey’s struggle 
to escape and the sight of its blood while being eaten alive. According to Nell, these 
reinforcers may have become attached, for example, to modern day warfare during the 
transition from predation and consumption to non-nutritional killing. Thus, wars and 
other aggressive behaviours that cause most of the non-nutritional killings could be 
explained as products of predatory adaptations that we have inherited from our 
evolutionary ancestors.   
 
In addition to these evolutionary theories, the advancement of technology has enabled 
scientists to look more deeply into the biological and genetic make up of animals to study 
aggressive behaviours. A number of studies suggest that certain hormones, 
neurotransmitters and genes are associated with aggressive and violent behaviours. For 
example, the deletion of a gene that produces nitric oxide, which functions as a 
neurotransmitter, or the inhibition of the enzyme which specifically secretes nitric oxide, 
was associated with an increase of aggression in mice (R. J. Nelson, 1995; Trainor, 
Workman, Jessen, & Nelson, 2007). Similarly, a defect in the gene that produces the 
enzyme monoamine oxidase-A (MAO-A) that is responsible for regulating certain 
neurotransmitters in the brain was linked to aggressive behaviour in mice (Cases et al., 
1995) and also to aggressive behaviours in members of a particular family with known 
impulsive aggression (Brunner, 1993). This gene found on the X chromosome is now 
more popularly known as the “warrior gene” (Gibbons, 2004). Accordingly, a number of 
subsequent studies have carried out research in the light of the MAO-A gene’s 
association with harmful and aggressive behaviours, such as for example, in exploring the 
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link between maltreated children and aggression (Caspi et al., 2002), or in studying 
aggressive or risk-taking behaviours among different ethnicities (see Lea & Chambers, 
2007). 
 
Although there are several variations in the different genetic explanations discussed 
above, they all suggest that aggressive behaviours and killing are largely inborn or 
inherited. Similarly, all these explanations underline the deterministic nature of human 
aggression. Moreover, although theories such as the instinct theory have been refuted or 
considered as outdated among the scientific community (Myers, 1999), research suggests 
that they are still popular among the general public and are influential in shaping people’s 
attitudes and behaviours (e.g., Bushman, 1999).  
 
So, it seems that with the advancement of science, older concepts such as the killer 
instinct or warrior instinct have become obsolete, but only to be replaced by concepts 
such as the warrior gene, and the essence of genetic explanations and its message to the 
public still remain the same. In fact, as it will be evident in the next section, genetic 
explanations of human behaviour have gained more popularity in recent times. 
 
Therefore, before reviewing the possible psychological effects of genetic explanations, 
firstly, in the following section, I will analyse the influence of genes at both the societal 
and at the individual levels.  
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1.3  Popularity and Influence of Genetic Explanations  
 
In August 2006, the news media in New Zealand and Australia were filled with reports of 
research in which scientists had found that Maori men have an over-representation of the 
warrior gene, thereby suggesting that Maoris are predisposed to violence and aggression 
(e.g. “Maori ‘warrior’,” 2006; “Warrior gene,” 2006). These reports were based on the 
findings presented at a genetic conference in Australia by the New Zealand researcher Dr. 
Rod Lea and his colleagues (Lea, Hall, Chambers, & Griffiths, 2006). The study was later 
criticised by other researchers on several scientific and methodological grounds. These 
include the lack of substantial evidence to make direct associations between MAO-A and 
aggression, the use of a small sample in the study, and the subsequent generalization (see 
Merriman & Cameron, 2007). Although the authors later claimed that their study was 
misunderstood and misquoted (Lea & Chambers, 2007), by then it had been widely 
covered by the media, especially in New Zealand, receiving much public attention and 
leading to controversy and debate (e.g., see Bennetts & McLean, 2006).  
 
The warrior gene hypothesis and the example of the research based on it mentioned 
above illustrate the popularity of genetic explanations with the public, as well as the 
sensitiveness of these genetically-oriented explanations. Moreover, during the last few 
decades, perhaps with the advancement of science and technology, genetic explanations 
as a basis for understanding human nature and human behaviour have gained popularity 
(Have, 2001; Lippman, 1991). For instance, the Human Genome Project and related 
undertakings are seen as revolutionising the fields of biomedicine, health sciences and 
behavioural sciences (Phelan, 2005). According to Lippman, we are going through a 
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geneticization process where individual differences and explanations and origins of 
behaviours or disorders are popularly told in genetic and hereditary terms. These views 
that suggest that we are essentially and ultimately products of our genetic makeup are 
often referred to as genetic essentialism (Nelkin & Lindee, 1995; Phelan, 2005). 
 
Likewise, genetic explanations are becoming more widely accepted by the general public 
(Conrad, 1997). For example, a Gallup poll suggests that in 1987, 60 percent of 
Americans believed that alcoholism is inherited, whereas a similar poll five years before 
showed that the majority did not believe that alcoholism is inherited (Peele, 1990). The 
extent to which society and popular culture are preoccupied with genes and genetic 
information has led some scholars to state that the gene has become a cultural icon of the 
modern world (Nelkin & Lindee, 1995).  
 
A major contributor to this popularity of genes and genetic explanations seems to be the 
media. As Conrad (1997) suggests, genetics seems to make good news. However, often 
that involves oversimplifying or misrepresenting the actual scientific claims on one hand 
and exaggerating or over-generalising inferences on the other hand. For example, 
although specific instincts, drives or genes do not solely determine, cause or control our 
characters and behaviours, and although theorists would usually acknowledge the 
influence of social, cultural and environmental factors (e.g., Buss, 2005; Lorenz, 1966; 
Wrangham & Peterson, 1997), it has been alleged that such information is not delivered 
to the public or portrayed in a manner that is congruent with the actual scientific findings 
(Conrad, 1997). One main reason for such incongruence could be that the scientific 
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information that is passed to the public through the popular media is not regulated and 
constrained in the same manner as in scientific journals or peer reviewed articles 
(Conrad, 1997; Rothstein, 2005). In addition, such media reports are often based on 
preliminary findings where researchers use media outlets to announce their findings 
hastily (Rothstein, 2005). Moreover, the prevalent political ideologies in a society can 
also influence the way the media report such findings (Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004), 
thereby affecting the way this information is disseminated to the public.  
 
The reason genetic explanations have become so invasive and powerful could also be that 
despite the pessimistic and deterministic view of human nature that they portray, there are 
certain aspects of genetic explanations that may appeal to people. Firstly, as Rothstein 
(2005) suggests, genetic explanations of human behaviour may appear to individuals to 
be “high tech” compared to experiential explanations. The reason could be that genetic 
explanations are based more on “harder” sciences such as biology and neuroscience that 
may be seen as more “concrete” or “tangible”, compared to the social sciences on which 
experiential explanations are based (Nelson, 1975). Secondly, in genetic explanations, 
specific human behaviours such as killing are linked to corresponding instincts, genes or 
hormones, in contrast to experiential explanations that are based on experience, cultural 
influences or learning mechanisms. In other words, as Conrad (1997) suggests, genetic 
explanations provide primary causes and specificity about behaviours.  It may be that 
people in general prefer to think about the causes of behaviour and social problems in 
simple and direct terms (Nelson, 1975). Thus, genetic explanations of human aggression 
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and killing may appeal to individuals because in addition to the perceived scientific 
aspects, they are often simple and easy to understand in their more basic forms. 
 
In sum, the popularity and influence of genetic explanations in society can be largely 
attributed to the advancement and success of genetic research and its disproportionate and 
often inaccurate presentation by the media. Moreover, I have presented some possible 
reasons, despite the deterministic and pessimistic nature of genetic explanations, that the 
general public may still be attracted to genetic explanations. Thus, regardless of the level 
of accuracy in genetic explanations, media reports and public perceptions of genetic 
explanations, these factors may further promote the popularity of genetic explanations.  
 
In the next section, I will discuss the possibility that genetic explanations of human 
nature or human behaviour may have psychological and behavioural implications, and 
then present some of the relevant research literature. 
 
1.4  Effects of Genetic Explanations on People’s Attitudes and Behaviour 
  
 
Given the popularity that genetic explanations seem to be enjoying, it is particularly 
critical to examine whether the adopting of these explanations affects the way people 
think or act.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the concern with emphasizing genetic explanations to the exclusion 
of experiential explanations is that, because genetic explanations suggest that human 
behaviours are predetermined, thereby supporting a genetic essentialist view of human 
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nature, they are more likely to constrain the way people think and act. For example, 
several scholars have suggests that theories about human nature can have effects on their 
subject matter and lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy (Dupré, 2003; Nelson, 1975). A self-
fulfilling prophecy is “in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new 
behaviour which makes the original false conception come true” (Merton, 1949, p. 181). 
Therefore, convincing people that aggression or killing is in their nature or genetic 
makeup, as many genetic explanations suggest, may lead people to think and act in ways 
that confirm these ideas.  
 
This self-fulfilling effect of genetic explanations may occur for several reasons. One is 
that when people accept a certain behaviour as something instinctually or genetically 
programmed into them, they may view it as the way it ought to be, and so accept and act 
on these behaviours more readily. Similarly, as suggested earlier, genetic explanations 
may lead people to think pessimistically about themselves, others and the problems of the 
world. In turn, this may lead to a feeling that these behaviours cannot be altered, and so 
may lead again to the accepting of and/or acting upon these behaviours more readily.  
 
However, theorists espousing genetic-related explanations for behaviour respond to the 
above suggestion by arguing that science is and should be value free and therefore, 
drawing moral or ethical conclusions from scientific findings is committing a naturalistic 
fallacy (cited in Dupre, 2003; Postmes, 2003). A naturalistic fallacy refers to “the mistake 
of deriving what ought to be from what is, or occasionally vice versa” (Coleman, 2001, p. 
478). In the current context, one would be committing a naturalistic fallacy if they 
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assume that just because aggression or killing is genetic or natural, it is moral or 
justifiable. The argument is meant to remind us that genetic explanations of killing and 
other human behaviours should not necessarily affect our moral judgments or behaviours 
because they do not necessarily imply that these behaviours are right or justified.     
 
However, although this argument suggests that we should not view genetic explanations 
as the way things ought to be, people may nevertheless respond in that manner when 
learning about these explanations. Several studies suggest that explanations rooted in 
genetic, biological and evolutionary theories may still have implications for people’s 
views, attitudes or judgements about themselves, others and about the problems of the 
world. 
 
For example, a study by Brescoll and LaFrance (2004) found that exposing participants to 
biological explanations about gender differences resulted in more stereotyping about 
gender, as compared to the exposure to sociocultural explanations. The researchers also 
found that sociocultural explanations increased participants’ beliefs about the mutability 
of such gender differences, whereas biological explanations did not have such an effect. 
The study used fictional explanations presented as a newspaper report about a gender 
difference in the ability to identify plants, referring either to biological or sociocultural 
factors as the cause of the difference.  
 
Furthermore, a recent study by Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2008) suggests that exposing 
people to genetic explanations leads the participants to judge a sex offender more 
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leniently. According to the authors, the explanations focused on the issue of gender 
differences in mate selection, based either on evolutionary arguments or social 
arguments. Similarly, a study by Monterosso, Royzman, & Schwartz (2005) suggests that 
genetic explanations may facilitate people to judge undesirable behaviours more 
leniently. The study examined participants’ judgements of the responsibility of actors 
who were depicted as having committed a socially or personally undesirable behaviour, 
such as setting fire to a building or overeating, respectively, when their misdeeds were 
explained either physiologically or experientially. Physiological explanations, such as a 
chemical imbalance or genetic abnormality, led participants to exonerate the anti-social 
actors, in contrast to experiential explanations such as abusive parents. These studies 
support the suggestion that genetic explanations may have negative implications for 
people’s attitudes and judgements.  
 
Moreover, some studies also indicate that genetic explanations could also affect people’s 
behaviour or performance.  One such example is a study by Dar-Nimrod and Heine 
(2006) which investigated whether women's maths performance could be affected by 
exposing them to either genetic or experiential explanations for the stereotype of 
women’s underachievement in maths. The results of this study indicated that the deficit in 
women's maths performance is reduced when women are presented with experiential 
accounts of the origins of the stereotyping as compared to the genetic accounts.  A 
possible reason for such effects may be that genetic explanations lead people to believe 
that their behaviour is more fixed or less malleable. In fact, Aronson, Fried, and Good 
(2002), in testing a method of helping African-American students to resist 
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underperformance, encouraged participants in the experimental group to view 
intelligence as a malleable rather than a fixed capacity. According to the authors, these 
participants reported a greater enjoyment of the academic process and greater academic 
engagement and obtained higher grade point averages than their counterparts in control 
groups. 
 
The studies mentioned above indicate that genetic explanations could result in a self-
fulfilling effect, possibly because such explanations lead people to unwittingly commit a 
naturalistic fallacy, as well as adopt pessimistic and deterministic views about moral and 
behavioural issues. A second reason that genetic explanations may have a self-fulfilling 
effect is that they may be used to justify undesirable behaviours that one has already 
committed or will have to commit in the future. In other words, because genetic 
explanations suggest that behaviours are more immutable and determined, they perhaps 
provide better excuses for such behaviour. One line of evidence which is consistent with 
this possibility comes from a series of studies and findings by Postmes and colleagues 
that examined the implications of endorsing theories rooted in biology about gender 
differences (Postmes, 2003).  According to Postmes, these studies suggest that 
evolutionary explanations are associated with certain ideologies and behavioural 
intentions that seek to legitimate and perpetuate gender inequality.  
 
In the next section, I will discuss in some detail the possibility that genetic explanations 
may also influence people’s attitudes towards killing and their killing behaviour in a way 
that may perpetuate aggression or killing. 
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1.5  Possible Effects of Genetic Explanations on Killing Behaviour and Attitudes on 
Killing 
 
As evident from the types of genetic explanations discussed in section 1.2, a major 
underlying feature of genetic explanations is that they suggest that our behaviours are 
predetermined and thereby suppose a deterministic view of human nature. In other words, 
genetic explanations suggest that we are in a certain way because we are programmed to 
be that way. Previous research findings discussed above support the claim that genetic 
explanations for human behaviour have implications for people’s attitudes, judgments 
and behaviours. They also support the possibility that such deterministic ideas about 
different aspects of human nature and human behaviour could affect corresponding 
behaviours and attitudes. Therefore, genetic explanations of killing may also affect 
people’s moral acceptance level and behaviour with respect to killing. 
 
As with genetic explanations for other behaviours, different reasons may exist for why 
genetic explanations of killing behaviour may facilitate killing and lead people to accept 
killing as morally more justifiable.  
 
First, since genetic explanations suggest that people are innately aggressive (Lorenz, 
1966), their minds are adapted to kill (Buss, 2005), or that there are certain genes and 
hormones responsible for killing, exposure to such knowledge may lead people to think 
that killing is somewhat acceptable—that what is natural or genetic is the way things 
ought to be—thereby committing a naturalistic fallacy.  The research discussed above 
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suggests that explanations espousing such genetic ideas have effects on people’s attitudes 
towards morally related issues; for example, on how people attribute responsibility for 
undesirable behaviours (Monterosso et al., 2005) or pass judgements on such offenders 
(Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2008). Therefore, if killing is seen as something in our nature, 
people may find it more morally right and more acceptable.  
 
Moreover, committing this naturalistic fallacy may also facilitate people to engage in 
more killing. Cross cultural surveys conducted across 19 countries and four areas of the 
United States indicated that differences in moral acceptance of killing were associated 
with differences in actual killing rates among these populations (McAlister, 2006). The 
study was based on interviews and questionnaires administered to students and adults 
about their attitudes towards justifications of killing and were compared to the 
national/regional homicide rates among those populations. Although, as the author has 
also acknowledged, the survey did not conclusively indicate that the two factors are 
strongly related, it suggests that the acceptability of killing and actual killing rates could 
be associated. Therefore, if genetic explanations lead people to commit a naturalistic 
fallacy, thus facilitating the moral acceptance of killing, it may also be accompanied by 
an increase in killing behaviour.  
 
As mentioned earlier, another reason that genetic explanations may perpetuate relevant 
attitudes and behaviours is because these explanations may provide particularly 
compelling justifications for people’s own behaviours that need justifying. In the case of 
killing, it seems plausible that genetic explanations may facilitate the acceptability of 
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killing and killing behaviour, because such explanations can be appropriated to justify 
people’s own behaviours or behaviours to be committed in the future, as discussed below.  
 
War accounts and documents suggest that people are often reluctant to engage in killing 
and that the military has to train people to kill, including psychologically undermining 
their passiveness and reluctance to kill (Bourke, 1999). This could be because killing is 
considered to be such a disapproved of and aggressive act (Lagerspetz &  Westman, 
1980), so to simply engage in or accept killing would create dissonance against an 
individual’s own positive self-image (Bandura, 1999; Chirot & McCauley, 2006). As 
Chirot and McCauley suggest, such reluctance and the need for justification may be 
particularly true in genocides or political mass killings, in which the enemy does not pose 
a direct or personal threat to the individual. However, genetic explanations help to 
portray a pessimistic or negative self-image by assuming that we are all aggressive in 
nature (for example, as suggested by the instinct theory) or that specific human 
populations or individuals are aggressive (for example, as suggested by the warrior gene 
hypothesis). Therefore, genetic explanations of killing could make these acts more likely 
to be justified, accepted and to occur.  
 
Similarly, since scholarly documents and personal accounts of war provide evidence that 
killing has a severe psychological impact, including guilt and dissonance in individuals 
who have engaged in killing (see Bourke, 1999; Baum, 2004), genetic explanations could 
serve to overcome such guilt and dissonance, thereby leading to further killing. This is 
because genetic explanations for killing attribute the causality of such acts to factors 
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outside the individual’s control. In fact, after the Vietnam War, American military 
psychiatrists started a process of “deresponsibilizing” veterans to ease their feelings of 
guilt and remorse by emphasising and attributing external causes for their killing, such as 
aggressive impulses (Bourke, 1999, p. 239). Although this may help to relieve the 
veterans of their distress, deresponsibilizing in this way could lead them to engage in 
more killing in the future. Previous theorizing as well as experimental research suggest 
that killing may perpetuate itself as a means to justify and ease the guilt and dissonance 
of the initial killing (Lifton, 1986; Martens, Kosloff, Greenberg, Landau, & Schmader,  
2007). Therefore, genetic explanations may facilitate the overcoming of such guilt by 
justifying these behaviours as being outside their control. This process may in turn 
promote a perpetuation of killing and the attitude that killing is morally acceptable.  
 
1.6  The Present Study  
 
The present study aims to test the idea that the exposure to genetic explanations for 
killing may change people’s attitudes so that they view killing as more morally 
acceptable, as well as exacerbate their killing behaviour. Genetic explanations of killing 
may affect killing behaviour and attitudes because they suggest that killing is in our 
nature and thus, it is moral or acceptable to kill. This may well make the individual more 
likely to engage in killing. Genetic explanations could also serve to increase killing and 
change attitudes, because they may be readily used to overcome guilt and dissonance 
over killing that people have already participated in or are about to participate in, and so 
make killing more likely to occur in the future.  
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To test the effects of genetic explanations on killing behaviour and moral acceptance of 
killing, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in which they 
were exposed to either genetic explanations for killing behaviour,  experiential 
explanations for killing behaviour or a control condition without any explanation for 
killing. Since I specifically intended to study killing behaviour and its associated 
psychological aspects, one obvious challenge was finding a methodology to study such 
behaviours in a direct, systematic and ethical way. Martens et al. (2007) developed a 
procedure to study killing behaviour in the laboratory in which participants are made to 
believe that they are killing bugs in an extermination task, though in actuality no bugs are 
killed. It involves participants tipping bugs into a supposed extermination machine (made 
from a modified coffee grinder) and then switching on the machine. I utilised this bug-
killing paradigm which enabled me to study killing behaviour in the laboratory as directly 
as possible, within the ethical and moral limits of experimentation.  
 
Specifically, participants were asked to take part in an extermination task in which they 
tipped bugs, one at a time, into an extermination machine over a period of 20 seconds. 
This task was self-paced, that is, they were not instructed to put in a lot of bugs or a few 
bugs. The dependent measures were the number of bugs each participant tipped into the 
machine during this 20-second task, and the participants’ subsequent rating of the extent 
to which they felt that killing bugs and other lower animals for scientific purposes is 
morally justifiable. Before this extermination task, participants were exposed either to 
genetic, experiential or control explanations for the causes and origins of bug-killing 
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behaviour in humans. In addition, we manipulated whether participants engaged in an 
initial killing task, presented ostensibly as a practice trial.   
 
It was specifically predicted that if genetic explanations have a self-fulfilling effect, then 
presenting participants with genetic explanations for bug-killing should lead them to 
engage in more killing and to view bug-killing as more morally acceptable, as compared 
to presenting an experiential explanation or no explanation for killing. In addition, one 
reason genetic explanations may take hold and affect people is that they are particularly 
useful for justifying behaviour that would otherwise cause guilt or shame. Thus, perhaps 
the effect of the genetic explanation would be most pronounced among participants who 
engaged in the practice initial killing, that is, who engaged in two killing tasks. Perhaps 
these participants who killed in two different tasks might feel even more need to justify 
their actions by way of changing their views on the moral acceptability of killing bugs 
and by actually killing more bugs in the second killing task.  This reasoning also suggests 
that an increase in the moral acceptability of killing would be accompanied by an 
increase in killing or vice versa. Therefore it was also predicted that there would be a 
positive correlation between the level of moral acceptance of killing and the number of 
bugs killed.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
  
METHOD 
 
 
2.1  Participants  
 
This study used a student sample from the University of Canterbury, recruited through 
advertising on the University’s notice boards and the website of the Stage One 
Participation Pool of the Psychology Department. All but one participant were paid 10-
dollar shopping vouchers as incentives. The other participant was from the Participation 
Pool, and received course credit for participating in the experiment. 
 
A total of 106 students from different departments of the University turned up for the 
study. From them, five discontinued the experiment after reading the information sheet 
and the consent form – they either did not want to “kill” bugs on moral or religious 
grounds, or did not feel comfortable “killing”. Also, seven participants were excluded 
from the analyses because it was found that they had participated in similar bug-killing 
experiments before. Another six participants were excluded from the analyses because 
they did not follow the directions properly. Therefore, a total of 88 participants (34 male, 
54 female) were considered for the final analysis. They ranged in age from 18 to 49, with 
a mean age of 23.88.  
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2.2  Design 
 
This study used a 3 (explanation type: genetic vs. experiential vs. control) × 2 (practice 
type: practice kill vs. no-practice kill) between subjects factorial design. The dependent 
variables were the number of bugs killed (as measured by the number of bugs each 
participant tipped into the machine during a self-paced 20-second extermination task) and 
the moral acceptance of killing bugs (as measured by the participants’ rating on the 
question that asked the extent to which they felt that killing bugs and other lower animals 
for scientific purposes is morally justifiable).  
 
Participants were randomly assigned to the six different conditions. Random assignment 
was achieved by shuffling the document packets (in groups of 6, containing 1 of each 
condition) and assigning packets from the shuffled batch to each participant in the order 
in which they arrived to take part in the study. The experimenter was blind to the 
explanation type that was assigned, but not to the killing type, as the latter involved 
providing different instructions to different killing type conditions.  
 
2.3  Materials and Procedure 
 
 
2.3.1  Introducing the experiment and cover story 
 
The experiment was conducted with one participant at each session. Upon arrival in the 
laboratory, the experimenter introduced himself to each participant as a research student 
at the Psychology Department and said, “Along with my colleagues, I’m researching in 
the area of the psychology of killing. Our work includes conducting experiments on 
killing in the laboratory as well as writing and contributing to journals and textbooks. Our 
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experimental work mainly involves studying cases where lower animals like bugs kill 
each other and cases where humans kill lower animals. So today you are invited to 
participate in two small projects that I’m currently involved in.” This cover story was 
used to prevent participants from becoming aware that there was manipulation in the 
study.  They were told that the first study (which was actually designed to manipulate the 
explanation type) involved getting feedback from students on some texts regarding 
killing behaviour that were being considered for inclusion in a chapter in an upcoming 
psychology book on killing. Participants were also told that the second study (which was 
actually designed to observe the number of bugs each participant killed) involved 
participating in an experiment for studying killing. Participants were told that the purpose 
of this second experiment was to understand peoples’ experiences when engaging in 
killing. At this stage, participants were informed that the second study specifically 
involved a short bug-killing task in the laboratory. They were then asked to read and sign 
a consent form if they wished to participate in these studies. 
 
2.3.2  Explanation type manipulation  
 
Depending on the condition to which the participant belonged, each participant was first 
given either the genetic, experiential, or control passages as stimuli material for the 
explanation type, before they were asked to engage in the killing tasks. The passages in 
the genetic and experiential conditions contained either exclusively genetic or exclusively 
experiential explanations for bug killing behaviour in humans, respectively. The passages 
in the control condition contained fictional information about a research finding which 
provided a control explanation topic—that of bugs killing other bugs. After each 
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paragraph and at the very end of each set of paragraphs, there were multiple choice 
questions relating to the clarity, content, ease of understanding and the participant’s 
interest in reading the passage. These genetic, experiential, and control passages, and the 
questions, are described in detail in section 2.4 below (also see Appendix A, B and C for 
the complete explanation questionnaires). To ensure that the participants took the 
materials seriously and to help the explanations appear scientifically backed, participants 
in all three conditions were told: “In this project we want to get some feedback for some 
materials that we are preparing to publish in a psychology textbook about killing. So I’ll 
give you some paragraphs. And we want to get your feedback to see how clear and easy 
to understand they are. And you are ideal participants because you are university students 
who are at least slightly interested in psychology, and that’s the type of people that these 
materials are going to be used by.” Participants then read the passages and answered the 
comprehension questions in private, while the experimenter waited at the other end of the 
room, which was partially separated.  
 
2.3.3  Killing procedures  
 
When participants finished the comprehension task described above, they were given a 
brief overview of the purported second study. They were told: “In this second project you 
are invited to participate in one of our practical experiments on killing. Here we are 
investigating people’s experiences while engaging in killing bugs. Before and after a 
short bug-extermination task, I’ll give you short questionnaires about the experience.” 
Participants were then led to the extermination area, which was at the other end of the 
room partially separated by a sliding door, where the bugs and the extermination machine 
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were placed on a desk.  In each session, 20 small slaters or woodlice, measuring about 1 
cm in length, were placed in small clear plastic cups, with one bug in each cup. All these 
cups were placed in a flat tray beside the extermination machine. An additional bug was 
placed in a similar cup, ready for the practice task, for participants in the practice killing 
condition.  The bug-killing machine was made from a coffee grinder, a piece of tubing 
and a plastic funnel. The tube was inserted into the side of the grinder’s bowl, and the 
plastic funnel sat at the other end of the tube. The grinder had a lid and fully concealed 
sides. Thus, it appeared from the outside that the tube led from the funnel to the blades of 
the grinder directly. However, the base of the tube where it was inserted into the grinder 
was fixed with a stopper, which actually stopped bugs from entering the grinder (see 
Appendix D for a picture of the machine).  
 
In the extermination area, all the participants were first introduced to the apparatus and 
the killing procedure. Participants were told: “First, I’m going to have you familiarise 
yourself with our extermination materials and procedure.” Under the pretence of 
familiarising them with the materials and the killing procedure, participants in the 
practice killing condition were additionally asked to kill a bug, before they were given 
the actual self-paced killing task during which we measured the number of bugs killed. 
During the familiarisation, they were instructed as follows: “So right now, I just want to 
ask you to dump this bug into the grinder to familiarise yourself with the procedure 
....OK, the next step is to turn on the exterminator by pressing that button for at least three 
seconds. So please go ahead and do that.…So that’s the procedure.” Participants who 
  
26
were in no-practice killing conditions were also familiarised with the equipment and the 
procedure, but they were not asked to kill a bug for practice.  
 
In the next stage, all the participants were asked to engage in the self-paced killing 
procedure that was designed to measure the number of bugs killed by each participant— 
one of the two main dependent variables of the experiment. Participants were told: “OK, 
now I’ll give you the extermination experience on your own and after that I’ll give you 
questionnaires regarding your experience and other aspects of the study.” Participants 
were given a digital timer and were instructed that, when the experimenter left the 
extermination area, they could begin the bug-extermination task by first putting some 
bugs into the grinder one at a time for a 20-second period, before switching on the 
machine. Participants were specifically instructed as follows: “What you shall do is put 
some bugs into the grinder one at a time for a 20-second period. That way everybody in 
the study has the same length of extermination experience. Please do this task 
continuously at your own pace over a 20-second period. Here’s a timer. When I close the 
door, you can just start the timer and put bugs into the grinder. When the 20 seconds is up 
the alarm will go off. At that point, stop the timer and turn on the grinder for at least three 
seconds.”  
 
All the instructions given to the participants throughout the experiment, including the 
cover stories for the explanation stimulus and the killing procedures, were kept the same, 
except the instruction to kill a bug for practice which was instructed only to participants 
in the practice-kill condition. 
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2.3.4  Measuring moral acceptance and other measures  
 
Following the bug-killing task, participants were guided back to their original location,  
the other end of the room, where they were asked to fill in a questionnaire which also 
included the scale to measure the level of moral acceptance—the other main dependent 
variable of the experiment. The first two questions were about the participant’s perceived 
choice during the killing task and aimed to check the extent to which the self-paced 
killing task was self-paced, by comparing participants’ perceptions of choice between the 
initial practice killing task and the self-paced killing task. The questions were: “During 
the 20-second timed extermination procedure, to what extent did you feel that the number 
of bugs you put in was your choice?” which was included for all participants; and “In the 
first task when you familiarised yourself with the extermination procedure, to what extent 
did you feel that putting the bug into the machine was your choice?” which was only 
included for participants in the practice killing condition. Next was the moral acceptance 
question which asked: “To what extent do you feel that killing bugs and other lower 
animals for scientific purposes is morally justifiable?” It was to be answered on a bipolar 
scale of 1 (not at all) to 9 (completely). These items were followed by a question which 
measured the believability of the paragraphs for the participants. It asked: “To what 
extent do you believe the information presented in the paragraphs on killing behaviour 
that we presented at the beginning for your feedback?” The last items on this 
questionnaire were about participants’ age and gender. 
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2.3.5  Debriefing  
 
At the end of all the experimental procedures, participants were debriefed on the 
deceptive components of the experiment and why they were necessary for the 
experiment. This was done in a sensitive manner and it was particularly stressed that they 
had not killed any bugs and that the important factor of the study was the manipulation of 
the type of explanations and to see their supposed effects. Participants in the genetic and 
experiential explanation conditions were informed that the information in the passages 
were not based on research findings or evidence even though similar theories may exist 
with regards to other behaviours, and participants in the control/neutral explanation 
condition were informed that the information in the passage was fictional. Participants 
were also informed that many scientists believe in the interaction of genetics and 
experience, rather than a sole factor. They were also briefed about the objectives of the 
study and its potential applications and benefits. Participants were then invited to express 
any concerns about the experiment and were then provided with a re-consent form for 
them to either allow us to use their data or request that it be destroyed. 
 
When each of the participants left, the experimenter recorded the number of bugs the 
participant placed in the extermination machine during the self-paced task. 
 
2.4  Stimulus Materials for Explanation Types  
 
 
Three separate sets of passages, each containing three paragraphs, comprised the three 
different “explanation” conditions—the genetic, experiential, and neutral/control 
explanations. Consistent with the cover story, the passages in all three conditions were 
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introduced by a rubric mentioning that the paragraphs were excerpts that were being 
considered for an upcoming psychology textbook on killing. Participants were asked in 
written instructions to read the materials carefully with special attention to content and 
meaning, and answer the questions honestly, saying that it would ultimately help to 
determine the effectiveness of the contents that we intended to include in the textbook. 
 
The passages in the two experimental conditions consisted of information and 
explanations regarding the origins and causes of bug killing behaviour in humans. As the 
sample paragraphs given below highlight, the passages in these two conditions were 
largely identical (including their sentence structure, presentation and length), except for 
those words or phrases that specifically portrayed the relevant type of explanation. They 
were written in such a way that they sounded similar to the existing genetic and 
experiential explanations, such as those discussed in the introduction section. The control 
passage provided an alternative reading task on a neutral explanation topic—that of bugs 
killing other bugs. Ensuring that participants in the control group also read information 
that contained words such as “killing” and “bugs” meant that participants in any specific 
group were not affected by these words alone because all groups read information 
containing these words. 
 
The passage in the genetic condition contained three separate paragraphs with exclusively 
genetic explanations for bug killing behaviour in humans. One paragraph read, for 
example, “Bug killing behaviour has evolved in us long ago, and appears to have been 
reinforced during our evolutionary past. Thus it is a part of our genetic make-up because 
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it helped our ancestors to stay safe from bugs and similar animals that could prove 
poisonous or harmful.  In turn, today, our genes tell us that we should keep our homes 
and work places free from bugs. Given that exterminating bugs that occupy our habitats 
have played a survival role since prehistoric times, humans have all inherited a specific 
genetic code that directs us to engage in bug killing and similar behaviours” (see 
Appendix A for the complete questionnaire for the genetic condition).   
 
The passage in the experiential condition contained three separate paragraphs with 
exclusively experiential explanations for bug killing behaviour. One paragraph read, for 
example, “Bug killing behaviour has been present and taught in our cultures for a long 
time, and appears to have been reinforced by our historical situations. Thus, it is a part of 
our cultural make-up because it has helped our ancestors to stay safe from bugs and 
similar animals that could prove poisonous or harmful. In turn, today, our culture and 
society tells us that we should keep our homes and work places free from bugs. Given 
that exterminating bugs that occupy our habitats have played a survival role since 
prehistoric times, for a very long time humans have been taught specific cultural 
prescriptions and values that direct us to engage in bug killing and similar behaviours” 
(see Appendix B for the complete questionnaire for the experiential condition).   
 
The passage in the control/neutral condition contained three separate passages containing 
fictional information about a research finding. One passage read, for example: “There is 
no doubt that the moon continues to influence several aspects of nature and living 
organisms. Interestingly, some correlational studies suggest that the full moon has an 
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influence on the behaviour of bugs and other small animals. One such study has shown 
that killing behaviour among bugs occurs only during a full moon. However, scientists 
have yet to analyse whether such findings definitively show that a full moon causes 
killing among bugs and other similar animals. Therefore, further studies are needed to 
explore the effects of the full moon on killing behaviour among bugs and other animals” 
(see Appendix C for the complete questionnaire for the control/neutral condition). 
 
After each paragraph and at the very end of each explanation passage were multiple 
choice questions relating to the clarity, content, ease of understanding and the 
participants’ interest in reading the passage. In addition to bolstering the cover story (that 
the purpose of this part of the study was to get feedback for these excerpts), these 
questions were designed to ensure that participants read their respective passage carefully 
and understood them. One comprehension question specifically served as a manipulation 
check. In the experiential condition, this question was, “According to the three 
paragraphs above, bug-killing behaviour in humans is caused by….” This was followed 
by the following choices for the genetic condition: “a. culture and learning; b. genes; c. 
diet; d. dreaming.” In the experiential condition the choices were arranged as: “a. genes; 
b. culture and learning; c. diet; d. dreaming.” In the control condition, the question was, 
“According to the three paragraphs above, bugs kill bugs during….”.This was followed 
by the following choices: “a. daytime; b. full moon; c. night; d. weekend.” Correct 
responses to these questions meant that participants had comprehended the respective 
passage and its intended message. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
3.1  Manipulation Checks 
 
 
The manipulation check to analyse whether participants comprehended the explanation or 
information given in the respective genetic, experiential and control conditions showed 
that 98.9% of the participants identified the correct answer to the comprehension 
question.  This suggests that the passages in all the conditions delivered their intended 
messages to the participants.  
 
To check whether, the self-paced killing task was relatively self-paced compared to the 
practice killing task for participants who killed one bug initially, their perceived choices 
during these tasks were analysed in a 2-way (choice: practice killing vs. self-paced 
killing) repeated measures ANOVA (An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical 
tests in the present study). As expected, participants felt that the number of bugs they put 
in the machine during the self-paced 20-second task was more from their choice (M = 
6.35, SD = 2.29) than the bug they put in the machine for the practice killing task (M = 
5.02, SD = 2.79), F(1, 42) = 11.44, p = .002. This suggests that the self-paced killing task 
was relatively self-initiated compared to the practice task. Also, since the mean rating of 
the participants’ perceived choice in the self-paced killing task was above the mid line of 
the 9-point scale (M =  6.34, SD = 2.53), it suggests that the experiment was successful in 
observing participants’ volitional killing behaviour, rather than solely their compliance 
with the experimenter.  
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The mean choice score for all participants during the self-paced killing task was 6.34 (SD 
= 2.53, N = 88). 
 
3.2  Moral Acceptance 
 
 
We first examined the hypothesis that exposing participants to genetic explanations for 
killing bugs would lead them to view killing as more morally acceptable, as compared to 
presenting an experiential explanation or no explanation for killing bugs. Further, we 
thought that if genetic explanations were used to justify killing behaviour, then  an effect 
of the genetic explanation on  moral acceptance  might emerge particularly among those 
participants who engaged in an initial killing task (in the practice condition) and so had 
two trials of killing (rather than just one) to justify. Thus, a 3 (paragraph type: genetic vs. 
experiential vs. control) × 2 (practice type: practice kill vs. no-practice kill) ANOVA was 
performed on the moral acceptance score.  
 
The results showed that the main effect of the paragraph type on the moral acceptance 
was significant, F(2, 82) = 5.01, p = .009. Participants in the genetic condition viewed 
bug killing as morally more acceptable (M = 6.19, SD = 1.89) than participants in the 
experiential condition (M = 4.69, SD = 2.35) and independent samples t-test showed that 
this difference was significant t(58) = 2.74, p = .008. Similarly, participants in the genetic 
condition viewed bug killing as morally more acceptable (M = 6.19, SD = 1.89) than 
participants in the control condition (M = 5.29, SD = 1.92) and this difference was close 
to significance, t(57) = 1.83, p = .07. The difference in the attitude of the participants in 
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the experiential and control groups was not significant, t(55) = 1.05, p = .30. Therefore, 
as predicted, compared to the experiential and control explanations, genetic explanations 
led participants to view that killing bugs is morally more acceptable.  
 
It was also predicted that the effect of genetic explanations on the moral acceptance 
would be most pronounced among participants who engaged in the practice initial killing 
because these participants engaged in two killing tasks and so had potentially more to 
justify.  
 
Consistent with this prediction, there was a significant interaction between the paragraph 
type and practice type, F (2, 82) = 3.33, p = .04. The means for moral acceptance by 
explanation type and practice type are presented in Table 1 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Mean levels of moral acceptance score (and standard deviations) by exposure to different 
explanations following practice killing and no practice killing 
 
 
                                                                        Explanation type 
 
                                           Genetic                   Experiential                    Control 
 
Practice type                   M         SD                  M           SD                  M         SD     
 
No practice killing         5.75       2.08               5.29       1.90                 4.75      1.71 
 
Practice killing               6.67       1.59               3.83       2.72                 5.69     2.02 
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Results showed that among those participants who killed a bug in the practice task, 
genetic explanations increased moral acceptance (M = 6.67, SD = 1.59) compared to the 
experiential explanation (M = 3.83, SD = 2.72), t(25) = 3.38, p = .002. Also among those 
participants who killed a bug in the practice task, there was a non-significant trend of 
higher moral acceptance in the genetic explanations (M = 6.67, SD = 1.59) compared to 
the control explanation (M = 5.69, SD = 2.02), t(29) = 1.49, p = .15. On the other hand, as 
can be seen from Table 1, among participants in the no-practice killing, the means were 
very similar, though there was a non-significant trend for the genetic explanations to 
increase the moral acceptance of killing bugs (M = 5.75, SD = 2.08) compared to the 
control explanation (M = 4.75, SD = 2.08),   t(26) = 1.35, p = .19.  
 
These results suggest that genetic explanations led participants to view that it is morally 
more acceptable to kill bugs, particularly if they had engaged in the practice killing task. 
Perhaps those participants who killed in two different tasks needed to justify their actions 
more by way of changing their views on the moral acceptability of killing bugs, and the 
genetic explanation appeared to foster this change in moral acceptability as compared to 
the experiential and control explanation conditions. As Figure 1 shows, the effect of the 
explanation type appears to have emerged particularly among participants who killed a 
bug in the practice task. These combined effects of the genetic explanations and the 
practice killing on moral acceptance supported our prediction that the effect of genetic 
explanations on the morality attitude would be most pronounced among participants who 
engaged in the practice initial killing.  
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Figure 1. Mean moral acceptance score by explanation type and practice type. 
 
Results also showed that, among participants in the practice killing condition, the effect 
of experiential explanations on the moral acceptance of killing (M = 3.83, SD = 2.72) was 
significantly lower compared to the control explanation (M = 5.69, SD = 2.02), t(26) = 
2.07, p = .049. This effect was not present when participants did not engage in the 
practice task. It could be that having to engage in more killing tasks led these participants 
to ponder more on the morality of their actions and the experiential explanations served  
them to think that it is morally less acceptable, since experiential explanations attribute 
responsibility more to individuals than to nature.  
 
Results from the ANOVA showed that the main effect of the practice type was not 
significant, F(1, 82) = .09, p = .76. The difference between the morality score of 
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participants who practised (M = 5.51, SD = 2.35) and those who did not practise (M = 
5.31, SD = 1.92) was very similar. 
 
3.3  Killing Behaviour 
 
 
It was hypothesized that presenting genetic explanations for killing bugs would lead 
participants to engage in more killing, as compared to presenting an experiential 
explanation or no explanation for killing. Additionally, it was thought that this effect 
might emerge particularly among those who killed a bug initially in the practice trial. To 
examine these hypotheses, a 3 (explanation type: genetic vs. experiential vs. control) × 2 
(practice type: practice kill vs. no-practice kill) ANOVA was performed on the number of 
bugs killed by participants.  
 
The results showed that the main effect of the explanation type was not significant, F(2, 
82) = .11, p = .89. There was very little difference in the number of bugs killed between 
the genetic condition (M = 6.29, SD = 3.42), the experiential condition (M = 6.48, SD 
2.85) and the control condition (M = 6.57, SD = 3.29). Thus, contrary to the prediction, 
exposure to genetic explanations did not increase the number of bugs killed, compared to 
the experiential and control explanation conditions. 
 
It was also predicted that the effect of genetic explanations on killing behaviour would be 
most pronounced among participants who engaged in the practice killing task. However, 
no significant interaction emerged between the paragraph type and practice type F(2, 82) 
= 1.36, p = .26. Therefore, contrary to the prediction, the effect of genetic explanations on 
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killing behaviour was not particularly pronounced among participants who engaged in the 
practice killing task.  
 
The results also showed that the main effect of the practice type was not significant, F(1, 
82) = .71, p = .40. The number of bugs killed by participants who practised killing (M = 
6.19, SD = 3.15) and those who did not practise killing (M = 6.69, SD = 3.19) were very 
similar. The means for killing by explanation type and practice type are presented in 
Table 2 and plotted in a graph in Figure 2. 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Mean numbers of bugs killed (and standard deviations) by exposure to different 
explanations following practice killing and no practice killing 
 
 
                                                                        Explanation type 
 
                                           Genetic                   Experiential                    Control 
 
Practice type                   M         SD                  M           SD                  M         SD     
 
No practice killing         5.81       3.51               7.00       2.83                 7.42      3.26 
 
Practice killing               6.80       3.36               5.75       2.83                 5.94      3.28 
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Figure 2. Mean number of bugs killed by explanation type and practice type. 
 
3.4  Relationship between Moral Acceptance and Killing  
 
 
The theorising in this study led to the prediction that the moral acceptability of killing 
would be related to the killing itself. Therefore, to test whether the number of bugs killed 
and the moral acceptance of bug killing were related, a correlation analysis was 
performed. The results indicate that there was a significant positive relationship between 
the number of bugs killed and the moral acceptance score, r = .26, N = 88, p = .013.  This 
suggests that, as predicted, participants’ moral acceptance of bug killing and their actual 
killing behaviour were related.  
 
The existence of this correlation would perhaps suggest that the patterns of the killing 
means and the moral acceptance means should mirror each other. However, as Figure 1 
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and Figure 2 suggest, they do not mirror each other, especially among people who did not 
engage in an initial practice killing. Therefore, it could be that this correlation exists only 
in certain conditions and disappears in others, and specifically, that perhaps the 
correlation between actual bug killing and the moral acceptance of bug killing only 
emerges among those who killed a bug during the practice task. To test this possibility, 
separate correlation analyses were performed between moral acceptance score and 
number of bugs killed for participants who practised killing and for participants who did 
not practise killing. It was found that there was a significant correlation between the 
moral acceptance score and killing in the practice killing condition, r = .44, N = 43, p = 
.003, but this correlation did not exist in the no practice killing condition, r = .08, N = 45, 
p = 61. Again, this is consistent with the pattern of results seen in Figures 1 and 2 . As 
Figure 2 indicates, the effects of the explanation type on killing behaviour in the practice 
condition have a somewhat similar pattern to the effects of the explanation type on moral 
acceptability. But among those who did not engage in a practice kill, the pattern from the 
explanation type on actual killing is dissociated from the pattern of the explanation type 
on the moral acceptance question. Thus, it appears that although the genetic explanations 
were effective in changing people’s attitude towards killing, perhaps they were not a 
strong stimulus to affect their killing behaviour, especially when people did not engage in 
the initial practice bug-killing.  
 
3.5  Gender 
 
 
Some previous experiments suggest that compared to females, male participants tend to 
aggress more, although these tendencies are not always consistent (Geen, 1998). So a t-
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test was performed to compare the mean moral acceptance score and the mean number of 
bugs killed by male and female participants in the present experiment. The results 
showed that the moral acceptance score of male participants (M = 6.03, SD =2.17) was 
significantly higher than that of female participants (M = 5.02, SD = 2.03),   t(86) = 2.21, 
p = .029). Similarly, the analysis of the mean number of bugs killed by male and female 
participants showed that the number of bugs killed by male participants (M = 7.24, SD = 
3.40) was higher than that of female participants (M = 5.94, SD = 2.93). This difference 
was nearly significant, t(86) = 1.89, p = .06. 
 
To check whether there was any interaction between gender and the explanation type, as 
well as gender and the practice type, a series of factorial ANOVAs were performed on 
the two dependent measures. A 3 (explanation type: genetic vs. experiential vs. control) × 
2 (practice type: practice kill vs. no-practice kill) × 2 (gender: male vs. female) between 
subjects ANOVA performed on the moral acceptance score did not reveal an interaction 
between gender and explanation type, F(2, 76) = 1.39, p =.26, or gender and the practice 
type, F(2, 76) = 1.13, p = .29. These results suggest that the effect of gender on moral 
acceptance was not significantly different between the control, genetic and experiential 
conditions, or between the practice and the no-practice killing conditions. 
 
Similarly, a 3 (explanation type: genetic vs. experiential vs. control) × 2 (practice type: 
practice kill vs. no- practice kill) × 2 (gender: male vs. female) between subjects ANOVA 
performed on killing revealed that gender did not interact either with explanation type, F 
(2, 76) =.22, p = .81, or practice type, F(2, 76) = 2.01, p = .16. These results suggest that 
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the effect of gender on killing was not significantly different between the control, genetic 
and experiential conditions, or between the practice and no-practice killing conditions. 
 
In general, the results suggest that compared to females, male participants viewed bug 
killing as more morally acceptable and killed more bugs., Therefore, we have found some 
support for the notion that males may aggress more compared to females. However, since 
gender did not interact with the explanation type or practice type with respect to the 
moral acceptance level or killing, it was not included in the main analysis above. 
 
3.6  Believability  
 
 
To investigate any possible effects of explanation type and practice type on the 
believability score (measured by participants’ rating on the extent to which they believed 
the information in the paragraphs), a 3 (explanation type: genetic vs. experiential vs. 
control) × 2 (practice type: practice kill vs. no-practice kill) ANOVA was performed on 
the believability score. One participant in the experiential condition did not respond to the 
believability item. Results showed that the main effect of the practice type on the 
believability was not significant, F (1, 81) = .90, p = .35. There was very little difference 
in the believability rating by participants who practised killing one bug (M = 5.70, SD = 
2.05) and participants who did not kill a bug for practice (M = 5.40, SD 2.40). Also, there 
was no significant interaction between the paragraph type and practice type, F(2, 81) = 
1.05, p = .36.  
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However, a main effect of the explanation type was nearly significant, F(2, 84) = 2.97, p 
= .06. Independent t–tests revealed that there was a significant difference in believability 
between the control condition (M = 4.93, SD =2.24) and the experiential condition (M= 
6.32, SD =2.02), t(54)= 2.44, p = .018. The difference in believability between the control 
condition (M = 4.93, SD =2.24) and the genetic condition (M = 5.40, SD = 2.25) was not 
significant, t (57) = .81, p =.42. Also, the difference in believability between the genetic 
condition (M = 5.40, SD = 2.25) and the experiential condition (M = 6.32, SD = 2.02) was 
close to significant, t(57) = 1.64, p = .11. This almost significant difference between the 
genetic and experiential explanation passages raises an important question: Did this 
difference arise because the experiential paragraphs were written more convincingly or 
because people generally think in experiential terms and so find experiential explanations 
more convincing? Given the fact that the two sets of paragraphs were largely identical in 
structure, perhaps the more plausible explanation is that people generally find 
experiential explanations more believable. On the other hand, given the popularity of and 
increase in the influence of genetic explanations in society, one might have also expected 
that genetic explanations would be more believable for the participants. Therefore, the 
reason for the experiential explanations being more believable is not very clear. One 
possibility is that maybe people generally think about topics, such as these, in 
experiential terms and therefore participants who read the experiential passage found the 
information to be more in alignment with their beliefs and thus rated the passage as more 
believable, as compared to participants who read the genetic explanations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
4.1  Summary and Discussion of the Findings 
 
 
4.1.1  Moral acceptance  
 
As predicted, this study found support for the hypothesis that exposure to genetic 
explanations for bug killing behaviour would lead participants to view bug killing as 
more morally acceptable. Participants who read the genetic explanations viewed, 
significantly more, that it is more morally acceptable to kill bugs, as compared to 
participants who read the experiential explanations. Also, participants who read the 
genetic explanations viewed more that it is more morally acceptable to kill bugs, 
compared to participants who read the control explanations, and this difference was 
approaching significance. Similarly, this study found support for the prediction that the 
effects of the genetic explanations on people’s attitude to bug killing would be most 
pronounced among participants who engaged in the practice killing task. Among 
participants who practised killing, there was a significant increase in the moral 
acceptance of killing bugs for those who read the genetic explanations, compared to those 
who read the experiential explanations. Also, among participants who practised killing, 
there was a non-significant trend of increased moral acceptability for those who read the 
genetic explanations, as compared to those who read the control explanations. However, 
among those who did not practise killing, there were no significant differences between 
participants who read the different explanations, though there was a non-significant trend 
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of increased moral acceptance of killing bugs by those who read the genetic explanations, 
compared to those who read the control explanations.  
 
One possible reason for the observed increase in the moral acceptance of killing among 
participants who were exposed to genetic explanations could be that these explanations 
suggested to participants that killing is in our nature or that people are programmed to be 
that way, thus, leading them to view that it is more moral or more acceptable to kill. In 
other words, genetic explanations may have led participants to commit a naturalistic 
fallacy. Furthermore, in this way, genetic explanations could also have served to 
overcome guilt and dissonance in participants who had already killed bugs. Perhaps those 
participants who killed in two different tasks (including the practice task) needed to 
justify their actions more by way of changing their views on the moral acceptability of 
killing bugs, and genetic explanations appeared to foster this change in the moral 
acceptability of killing as compared to the experiential and control explanation 
conditions. This explains the pronounced increase in the moral acceptance of killing 
among participants who killed in the practice task and who read the genetic explanations. 
The finding that the effects of genetic explanations on moral acceptance significantly 
emerged only among participants who practised an additional killing task suggests that 
one important effective component of genetic explanations could be that they serve to 
justify one’s previous negative behaviour, by interacting with that behaviour and thereby 
exacerbating the effects.  
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In an additional observation, we also found that among participants in the practice killing 
condition, the effect of experiential explanations on the moral acceptance of killing was 
significantly lower, compared to those who read the control explanation. Perhaps having 
to engage in more killing tasks led these participants who practised killing to ponder the 
morality of their actions more, and the experiential explanations helped them to think that 
it is morally less acceptable, since the experiential explanations attribute responsibility 
more to individuals than to nature. 
 
In general, the findings of the present study on the effects of genetic explanations on the 
moral acceptability of killing bugs are consistent with previous research findings that 
genetic explanations are more likely to constrain the way  people think about morally 
related issues; such as, for example, the way people stereotype gender differences 
(Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004), seek to legitimate and perpetuate gender inequality 
(Postmes, 2003), attribute responsibility for undesirable behaviours or offenders 
(Monterosso et al., 2005) or how they pass judgements on such offenders (Dar-Nimrod & 
Heine, 2008). However, these previous studies that investigated the effects of explanation 
types on attitudes or judgments either focused mainly on the changes in the attitudes or 
judgments of participants regarding the behaviours of others (e.g., Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 
2008; Monterosso et al., 2005), or behaviours as a general conception (e.g., Brescoll & 
LaFrance, 2004), rather than the behaviours or attitudes that are directly relevant to the 
participant.  
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4.1.2  Killing behaviour  
 
In the present study, we also hypothesised that genetic explanations for killing bugs 
would lead participants to engage in more killing, as compared to presenting an 
experiential explanation or no explanation for killing. Additionally, we thought this effect 
might emerge particularly among those who killed a bug initially in the practice trial. 
However, the results failed to show any of these effects on people’s killing behaviour. 
That is, contrary to our hypothesis, we neither found an increase in killing among 
participants in the genetic condition nor a pronounced effect of the genetic explanations 
when participants engaged in a practice killing.   
 
This is somewhat surprising, especially since there was a significant positive correlation 
between the morality score and the number of bugs killed. This correlation would suggest 
that the effects of genetic explanations on moral acceptability and on killing should 
mirror each other. However, as the results discussed above indicate, genetic explanations 
had no significant effects on killing behaviour. However, follow-up analyses showed that 
a significant correlation between the moral acceptance score and killing behaviour 
existed only in the practice killing condition, and not in the no-practice killing condition. 
And the effects of the explanation type on killing behaviour for those who practised 
killing had a pattern more similar to the effects of the explanation type on moral 
acceptability. When participants engaged in a practice killing task, their killing behaviour 
showed a pattern that was similar to the effects of genetic explanations on moral 
acceptability, although it was still not significant.  
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Therefore, future research could extend the findings of the present study by increasing the 
number of bugs that participants have to kill during the practice task, to test if this, in 
combination with genetic explanations, shows any significant effect on people’s killing 
behaviour. This suggestion is supported by our theorizing in the present study and the 
finding by Martens et al. (2007) that more initial killing would lead to more justification 
of these behaviours and therefore, more killing in the self-paced killing task. 
 
Future research could also better examine the correlation showing that participants who 
viewed that killing bugs is morally more justifiable killed more bugs. This finding 
supports the previous observation from the cross-cultural correlation study by McAlister 
(2006), which found that the levels of moral acceptance of killing were associated with 
the killing rates among these those populations. Since the results from the present study 
were also obtained from a correlation analysis, future research could extend these 
findings to check for any cause-effect involved in these associations, by conducting 
laboratory experiments.  
 
4.1.3  Gender  
 
The present study found that the moral acceptance of killing bugs among male 
participants was significantly higher than that of female participants. These results 
support the findings from a cross cultural survey by McAlister et al. (2001), which 
suggests that the justification of killing is less common among females, compared to 
males. Similarly, the present study found that the mean number of bugs killed by male 
participants was higher than that of female participants and this difference was nearly 
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significant. These results support the notion based on some previous studies that suggests 
that compared to females, male participants tend to be more aggressive, although these 
tendencies are not always consistent (Geen, 1998). Future research on killing or 
aggression may take these into consideration or further explore these effects of gender.  
 
4.2  General Implications  
 
 
The present study found that the exposure to genetic explanations for killing bugs led 
participants to view that it was more morally acceptable to kill bugs for scientific 
research. This has an important implication – despite the objection of the naturalistic 
fallacy argument by those who support genetic explanations, these results suggest that 
theories espousing genetic and evolutionary ideas about human behaviour would affect 
people’s moral and ethical judgments. In other words, it suggests that genetic 
explanations would lead people to assume that, because killing is genetic or natural, then 
it is more moral or justifiable to kill, thus committing a naturalistic fallacy.  Therefore, 
even if scholars researching or promoting genetic explanations emphasise and protest to 
their critics that their genetic findings are value-free, the present study further supports 
the criticism and research evidence that such explanations may nevertheless have 
negative social implications (eg: S. D. Nelson, 1975; Conrad, 1997; Brescoll &  
LaFrance, 2004; Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2007, 2008).  
 
Another important implication of genetic explanations due to their effects on people’s 
moral attitude is that, although individuals who are exposed to genetic explanations of 
killing may not develop a tendency in themselves to kill more, their acceptance of killing 
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may be exploited by institutions and states, because genetic explanations for killing 
among humans may provide certain economic or political benefits for these institutions. 
For example, aggressive states or military organisations may tend to promote genetic 
explanations of human aggression and killing behaviour to obtain public acceptance for 
legitimizing wars or state sponsored violence and killing (S. D. Nelson, 1975); for 
example, by means of emphasising that it is a natural human condition, as suggested by 
evolutionary and instinct theories. Additionally, if the public complains of exaggerated 
killings or cruel acts during conflicts, riots or warfare, authorities may try to shift the 
responsibility on to individual soldiers or police officers by appealing to genetic defects, 
hormonal imbalances and similar individual aspects, as suggested in some genetic 
explanations. Moreover, if genetic explanations for killing lead people to accept the 
justification of killing more easily, such explanations may be misused by states or groups 
to legitimize genocide and mass killing. According to Alvarez (2001), states inclined to 
commit genocide may often seek and manipulate scientific theories and ideas, as well as 
employ professionals in legitimizing or justifying these actions. Therefore it is crucial 
that scientists and professionals are mindful of the extent to which their theories and 
explanations may have negative social implications.    
 
The findings of this study may have implications not only regarding the genetic 
essentialist explanations, but also for any other theory or idea that promotes a pre-
dispositional or deterministic view of human conflict and killing. In the way the scientific 
community polarises and debates genetic versus experiential explanations regarding 
human nature and behaviour, there is a similar issue and debate within the domains of 
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theology and philosophy based on determinism versus free will (Wallerstein, 1997). 
Since the present study suggests that deterministic genetic explanations may influence 
people’s moral views, it could be assumed that similar deterministic explanations based 
on religious grounds may have negative implications as well. This is particularly relevant 
to highly religious societies, where the general public are more likely to be influenced by 
explanations for human conflict and problems from a religious angle. Therefore, scholars 
and commentators from different nations and from different domains of society should be 
mindful of the way their research and commentaries may be disseminated to and 
interpreted by the general public, particularly if their ideologies portray a deterministic 
view of conflict, aggression and killing. 
 
Perhaps a solution to prevent the general public from committing the naturalistic fallacy 
as a result of their exposure to such genetic information would be to caution or warn 
people against inferring or interpreting moral judgments based on such reports. However, 
a study by Friedrich (2005) found that even when participants were warned that making 
moral inferences from an empirical research is unjustified, it did not fully prevent them 
from deriving such unwarranted inferences from fictitious empirical research that was 
given to them to read. Nevertheless, it is important for future research that focuses on the 
naturalistic fallacy-related effects of genetic explanations to test whether cautioning 
against making moral judgements from genetic and evolutionary explanations of human 
behaviour prevents these kinds of judgments.  
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Although not conclusive, the present study further suggests that experiential explanations 
may have the opposite effect on people’s moral attitudes compared to genetic 
explanations. In some conditions, we found a non-significant pattern of a lower moral 
acceptance of killing by the experiential explanations, compared to the control 
explanations. This pattern became significant among participants in the experiential 
condition who practised killing a bug, thus lowering their acceptance of bug killing, 
compared to participants in the control explanation condition who killed a bug for 
practice. This suggests that experiential explanations might moderate the possible 
negative effects of genetic explanations. Therefore, one possible way to minimise the 
negative impacts of genetic explanations could be to emphasise the contribution or role of 
experiential aspects when discussing genetic explanations and theories. This is especially 
important since specific instincts, drives or genes do not solely determine, cause or 
control our behaviours and most modern theorists are inclined towards integrative 
theories of genes and experience. This suggests the importance of disseminating or 
presenting such information to the public in a balanced and careful manner. 
 
4.3  Limitations and Strengths of the Study, and Future Directions 
 
 
Although the present study successfully examined the effects of genetic explanations on 
the moral acceptability of bug killing, there were some limitations that need to be 
acknowledged. 
 
The present study predicted and found evidence for the notion that genetic explanations 
would increase the moral acceptance of bug killing and that an additional practice killing 
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task would exacerbate this effect, because those who kill bugs in two tasks would have 
more to justify. It was also found that an additional practice killing task, without 
considering the type of explanation participants received, did not affect the moral 
acceptance level, suggesting that there was no direct effect of killing one bug for practice. 
However, it should be noted that the study did not make it clear whether the effect on the 
moral acceptability of killing was directly due to genetic explanations or to a combination 
of the killing task and genetic explanations, since the moral acceptance question only 
came after the main killing task. Therefore, it is important for future research to establish 
whether genetic explanations have a direct effect on people’s moral acceptance of killing, 
that is by way of analysing its effect among people who have not already killed any bugs 
in the particular experiment.  
 
This study utilised bugs and a bug-extermination machine similar to the one developed 
by Martens et al. (2007). This procedure has its strengths and limitations. This procedure 
enabled us to study killing behaviour in the laboratory in a very direct way, within the 
ethical and moral limits of experimentation. However it should be noted that bugs and 
concepts about bug killing to study killing and attitudes on killing are obviously very 
different from humans and killing among humans, which limits the application of our 
findings in real world situations involving human aggression and killing. Therefore, it 
should be noted that generalisations from this study to human killing and attitudes to 
killing humans or other higher animals should only be made with caution.  
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Additionally, the objection could be raised that the present study did not really study 
killing in an aggressive sense as it did not manipulate any intention in participants to hurt 
the bugs. In other words, it could be that participants were intending to help with the 
experiment or were complying with the instructions given. Although there may be some 
truth in this, it should be noted that the experimental passages did portray that bugs are 
harmful and responsible for certain diseases. Therefore, participants may have acted in an 
aggressive manner. The present study, however, did not check this as a manipulation. 
Nevertheless, the mean ratings of the participants’ perceived choice in the practice killing 
task as well as in the self-paced killing task were above the mid line of the 9-point scale, 
suggesting at the very least, participants’ volitional killing behaviour, rather than solely 
their compliance with the experimenter. Further, even if these results for perceived choice 
are not very impressive, it should be noted, as discussed in the introduction, that 
sometimes in warfare, genocides or mass killings, the victims may not directly pose a 
threat and so the executioner may just be carrying out orders or instructions from a higher 
or trusted authority.  
 
Certain aspects of the explanation passages may also limit some of our findings with 
respect to generalising. The manipulation passages used in the present study were quite 
brief and were on topics of bug killing, because the purpose of the study was to see the 
effects of such explanations on people’s killing behaviour, and this limited the kind of 
killing topic we could use. For example, since we cannot observe human killing in the 
laboratory, it is more unrealistic to use explanations about human killing as a 
manipulation. Future research could further extend and explore this finding using genetic 
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explanations or theories about killing behaviour among humans to see whether there is a 
general effect on moral acceptability or justification of different types of killing among 
humans (for example, killing as a punishment, killing during war, or killing for revenge 
and so on). One thing such a follow up research could also look at is to check whether 
people in general subscribe more to experiential or genetic explanations regarding the 
causes of killing and aggression, and whether such existing perspectives in people have 
different effects on their attitude or behaviour when exposed to exclusively genetic or 
exclusively experiential explanations.  
 
Furthermore, this study utilised a university student sample instead of a random sample 
from the general public. Although this might limit the generalisability, perhaps in the 
sense that the sample represents a population from a specific socioeconomic level and 
hence not a very “general” population, the fact that it was a student sample gives strength 
with respect to the implications of the findings. That is, maybe such genetic explanations 
would elicit more negative effects among lay people, whereas most students would be 
more aware of the biased explanations and/or the interaction of genes and experience. 
However, it is important to extend these findings to check and compare the extent to 
which the general public or other specific groups within the general public may be 
affected by genetic explanations. Since the public are more exposed to media reports than 
journal papers or textbooks, the manipulation for such a study could use such news 
reports. 
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Despite the limitations discussed above, the present study is the first experimental 
evidence to suggest that genetic explanations have negative effects on people’s moral 
attitudes about killing and that when combined with additional killing, these effects of 
genetic explanations may exacerbate the effects on people’s attitudes about killing. It 
suggests that geneticists and evolutionary psychologists cannot ignore the possible 
negative implications of their theses simply by relying on the naturalistic fallacy 
arguments. Therefore, given the popularity and influence of genetic explanations in 
recent times, it is important that scientists and the news media present a balanced analysis 
and take precautions when disseminating genetic information about aggression and 
killing to the public.     
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APPENDIXES 
 
 
Appendix A: Genetic Paragraphs 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
 
As a university student, it is ultimately your opinion that determines what text book 
material is considered appropriate and effective. That is why we are asking you to read 
and provide us feedback on some excerpts that are being considered for an upcoming 
psychology textbook about killing. On the next page, you are given a few paragraphs 
related to the psychology of killing that will present variations on a particular topic. 
Please read them carefully, with special attention to the content and meaning of each 
excerpt. After each paragraph and at the end of the text you will see some questions 
related to the text. Please answer these with your first, honest response by circling the 
number that best reflects your opinion. Thank you for your participation. 
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Paragraph 1 
According to psychological theories, we often kill bugs and other similar animals because 
it is part of our genetic programming—it is built in to us. One reason that scientists think 
that it became part of our genetic programming is that it may have helped our ancestors 
clean their environment and avoid diseases and other harmful aspects associated with 
some types of bugs and other lower animals. We are programmed in a way to kill bugs 
indiscriminately so as to avoid any risks, by preventing them from carrying diseases, 
poisoning our food, or harming us in any way. Thus, to maximize our chances of 
survival, our genes have evolved so that we kill bugs and keep our surroundings clean 
from the varieties of bugs and similar lower animals.  
1.  How clearly was this paragraph written? 
Not at all clear         1          2          3         4         5        6         7        Extremely clear 
2. How easy was this paragraph to read? 
Not at all easy         1           2          3        4          5         6        7        Extremely easy 
 
 
Paragraph 2 
That we are genetically programmed to kill bugs may have evolved in humans for various 
reasons. One may be that killing bugs functions as a strategy to keep our environment 
clean and safe. But what psychological processes are motivated by these genes? These 
genes lead us to perceive that bugs are either threatening, for example because we fear 
that they might spread a disease or may poison our food. And our genes lead us to 
perceive bugs as simply disgusting. By these psychological means, genes motivate us to 
take safety measures against the threat of certain bugs and lower animals. Thus, bug-
killing behaviour is genetically programmed through inborn and instinctual tendencies 
that keep us and our environment safe and clean. 
1. How clearly was this paragraph written? 
Not at all clear         1          2          3         4         5        6         7        Extremely clear 
2. How easy was this paragraph to read? 
Not at all easy         1           2          3        4          5         6        7        Extremely easy 
 
 
Paragraph 3 
Bug killing behaviour has evolved in us long ago, and appears to have been reinforced 
during our evolutionary past. Thus it is a part of our genetic make-up because it helped 
our ancestors to stay safe from bugs and similar animals that could prove poisonous or 
harmful.  In turn, today, our genes tell us that we should keep our homes and work places 
free from bugs. Given that exterminating bugs that occupy our habitats have played a 
survival role since prehistoric times, humans have all inherited a specific genetic code 
that directs us to engage in bug killing and similar behaviours.   
1. How clearly was this paragraph written? 
Not at all clear         1          2          3         4         5        6         7        Extremely clear 
2. How easy was this paragraph to read? 
Not at all easy         1           2          3        4          5         6        7        Extremely easy 
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I. According to the three paragraphs above, bug-killing behaviour in humans is 
caused by: 
 
a. culture and learning 
b. genes 
c. diet 
d. dreaming 
 
II. Which paragraph did you find most interesting? 
  
a. Paragraph 1 
b. Paragraph 2 
c. Paragraph 3 
 
III. How much would you enjoy reading more about the topic presented on the 
previous page? 
 
a. Not at all 
b. Slightly 
c. Moderately 
d. Very much 
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Appendix B: Experiential Paragraphs 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
 
As a university student, it is ultimately your opinion that determines what text book 
material is considered appropriate and effective. That is why we are asking you to read 
and provide us feedback on some excerpts that are being considered for an upcoming 
psychology textbook about killing. On the next page, you are given a few paragraphs 
related to the psychology of killing that will present variations on a particular topic. 
Please read them carefully, with special attention to the content and meaning of each 
excerpt. After each paragraph and at the end of the text you will see some questions 
related to the text. Please answer these with your first, honest response by circling the 
number that best reflects your opinion. Thank you for your participation. 
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Paragraph 1 
According to psychological theories, we kill bugs and other similar animals because it is 
part of our cultural programming—taught to us by our culture. One reason that scientists 
think this behaviour became part of our culture is because it helped our ancestors clean 
the environment and avoid diseases and other harmful aspects associated with some types 
of bugs and other lower animals. We have learned through our upbringing to kill bugs 
indiscriminately, so as to avoid any risks, by preventing them from carrying diseases, 
poisoning our food or harming us in any way. Thus, because it maximized our chances of 
survival, our culture developed so that we are taught to kill bugs and keep our 
surroundings clean from the varieties of bugs and similar lower animals.  
1. How clearly was this paragraph written? 
Not at all clear         1          2          3         4         5        6         7        Extremely clear 
2. How easy was this paragraph to read? 
Not at all easy         1           2          3        4          5         6        7        Extremely easy 
 
 
Paragraph 2 
That we have learned to kill bugs may have been incorporated into human cultures for 
various reasons. One may be that killing bugs functions as a strategy to keep our 
environment clean and safe. But what psychological processes are motivated by these 
cultural norms? These norms lead us to perceive that bugs are either threatening, for 
example because we fear that they might spread a disease or may poison our food. And 
our cultural norms lead us to perceive bugs as simply disgusting. By these psychological 
means, cultural norms motivate us to take safety measures against the threat of certain 
bugs and lower animals. Thus, bug-killing behaviour is learned through cultural and 
social influences that keep us and our environment safe and clean. 
1. How clearly was this paragraph written? 
Not at all clear         1          2          3         4         5        6         7        Extremely clear 
2. How easy was this paragraph to read? 
Not at all easy         1           2          3        4          5         6        7        Extremely easy 
 
Paragraph 3 
Bug killing behaviour has been present and taught in our cultures for a long time, and 
appears to have been reinforced by our historical situations. Thus, it is a part of our 
cultural make-up because it has helped our ancestors to stay safe from bugs and similar 
animals that could prove poisonous or harmful. In turn, today, our culture and society 
tells us that we should keep our homes and work places free from bugs. Given that 
exterminating bugs that occupy our habitats have played a survival role since prehistoric 
times, for a very long time humans have been taught specific cultural prescriptions and 
values that direct us to engage in bug killing and similar behaviours.   
      1. How clearly was this paragraph written? 
Not at all clear         1          2          3         4         5        6         7        Extremely clear 
2. How easy was this paragraph to read? 
Not at all easy         1           2          3        4          5         6        7        Extremely easy 
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I. According to the three paragraphs above, bug-killing behaviour in humans is 
caused by: 
 
a. genes  
b. culture and learning  
c. diet 
d. dreaming 
 
II. Which paragraph did you find most interesting? 
  
a. Paragraph 1 
b. Paragraph 2 
c. Paragraph 3 
 
III. How much would you enjoy reading more about the topic presented on the 
previous page? 
 
a. Not at all 
b. Slightly 
c. Moderately 
d. Very much 
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Appendix C: Control/Neutral Paragraphs 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
 
As a university student, it is ultimately your opinion that determines what text book 
material is considered appropriate and effective. That is why we are asking you to read 
and provide us feedback on some excerpts that are being considered for an upcoming 
psychology textbook about killing. On the next page, you are given a few paragraphs 
related to the psychology of killing that will present variations on a particular topic. 
Please read them carefully, with special attention to the content and meaning of each 
excerpt. After each paragraph and at the end of the text you will see some questions 
related to the text. Please answer these with your first, honest response by circling the 
number that best reflects your opinion. Thank you for your participation. 
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Paragraph 1 
Bugs and other small animals are known to exhibit many interesting and odd behaviours. 
But you may have never thought about this—that bugs kill other bugs during the full 
moon, but not during other times of the month. Studies indicate that an association exists 
between the lunar cycles and the behaviour of bugs and other similar animals. 
Specifically, one recent study has shown that bugs engage in killing other bugs during a 
full moon and not during other periods of the month. However, further experiments are 
needed to show causation—that the full moon causes killing among bugs and other lower 
animals.  
1. How clearly was this paragraph written? 
Not at all clear         1          2          3         4         5        6         7        Extremely clear 
2. How easy was this paragraph to read? 
Not at all easy         1           2          3        4          5         6        7        Extremely easy 
 
 
Paragraph 2 
There is no doubt that the moon continues to influence several aspects of nature and 
living organisms. Interestingly, some correlational studies suggest that the full moon has 
an influence on the behaviour of bugs and other small animals. One such study has shown 
that killing behaviour among bugs occurs only during a full moon. However, scientists 
have yet to analyze whether such findings definitively show that a full moon causes 
killing among bugs and other similar animals. Therefore, further studies are needed to 
explore the effects of the full moon on killing behaviour among bugs and other animals. 
1. How clearly was this paragraph written? 
Not at all clear         1          2          3         4         5        6         7        Extremely clear 
2. How easy was this paragraph to read? 
Not at all easy         1           2          3        4          5         6        7        Extremely easy 
 
 
Paragraph 3 
Since medieval times, people have associated many odd behaviors of humans and 
animals with the different phases of the moon, particularly the full moon. Until recently, 
there have been no scientific studies that investigate such claims. However, one recent 
study showed that killing behaviour among bugs occurs during the time of the full moon, 
but not during the other periods of the month. However, it is too early to confirm whether 
such findings prove causation—that a full moon causes killing among bugs. Thus, further 
studies analyzing the circumstances are needed to establish any causal relationship. 
 
1. How clearly was this paragraph written? 
Not at all clear         1          2          3         4         5        6         7        Extremely clear 
2. How easy was this paragraph to read? 
Not at all easy         1           2          3        4          5         6        7        Extremely easy 
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I. According to the three paragraphs above, bugs kill bugs during: 
 
a. daytime 
b. full moon 
c. night 
d. weekend 
 
II. Which paragraph did you find most interesting? 
  
a.  Paragraph 1 
b. Paragraph 2 
c.  Paragraph 3 
 
III. How much would you enjoy reading more about the topic presented on the 
previous page? 
 
a. Not at all 
b. Slightly 
c. Moderately 
d. Very much 
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Appendix D: Bug-extermination Machine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
